Cloud storage systems are becoming increasingly popular. A promising technology that keeps their cost down is deduplication, which stores only a single copy of repeating data. Client-side deduplication attempts to identify deduplication opportunities already at the client and save the bandwidth of uploading copies of existing files to the server.
INTRODUCTION
The rapid adoption of Cloud services is accompanied by increasing volumes of data stored at remote servers, so techniques for saving disk space and network bandwidth are needed. A central up and coming concept in this context is deduplication, where the server stores only a single copy of each file, regardless of how many clients asked to store that file. All clients that store the file merely use links to the single copy of the file stored at the server. Moreover, if the server already has a copy of the file, then clients do not even need to upload it again to the server, thus saving bandwidth as well as storage (this is termed client-side deduplication). Reportedly, business applications can achieve deduplication ratios from 1:10 to as much as 1:500, resulting in disk and bandwidth savings of more 90% [8] . Deduplication can be applied at the file level or at the block level, and this paper focuses on file-level deduplication. (Block-level deduplication is discussed briefly in Section 6.)
In a typical storage system with deduplication, a client first sends to the server only a hash of the file and the server checks if that hash value already exists in its database. If the hash is not in the database then the server asks for the entire file. Otherwise, since the file already exists at the server (potentially uploaded by someone else), it tells the client that there is no need to send the file itself. Either way the server marks the client as an owner of that file, and from that point on there is no difference between the client and the original party who has uploaded the file. The client can therefore ask to restore the file, regardless of whether he was asked to upload the file or not.
Harnik et al. observed recently that client-side deduplication introduces new security problems [14] . For example, a server telling a client that it need not send the file reveals that some other client has the exact same file, which could be a sensitive information. The findings in [14] apply to popular file storage services such as MozyHome and Dropbox, among others.
Potential Attacks. Below we list some plausible attacks, supporting our main point that representing a large file by a small piece of "not really secret" information is a bad idea.
Usage of a common hash function This is essentially the attack described in the previous example, where the deduplication system uses a standard hash function. (It was recently reported that Dropbox uses SHA256 [1] .) In that case it is plausible that an attacker can obtain hash values of files owned by other users (e.g., if these hash values are used elsewhere or the user publishes a signature on the file).
Using the storage service as an unintended CDN In this scenario, Alice the attacker uploads a copy of a (potentially huge, and possibly copyright infringing) file to the storage server and publishes the hash of that file (e.g., on her web page). Now anyone wishing to obtain the file can attempt to upload it to the storage service, present the hash value to the service and be identified as owning that file, and then ask to restore the file from the storage service. Hence Alice essentially uses the storage service as a content distribution network (CDN). This behavior may run afoul with the business model of that storage server, which is likely to be designed to support many uploads but very few restore operations. This behavior might also support piracy and copyright infringing behavior.
Server break-in Consider an attacker that is able to temporarily compromise a server machine, getting access to its internal cache, which includes the hash values for all the recently accessed files. Having obtained this (relatively small) piece of information, the attacker is now able to download all these files, which may include confidential files of others. The attacker can even publish these hash values, thus enabling anyone in the world to get these files.
Note that it is unlikely that the attacker can use a short compromise event to actually download all the large files, but the server cache may be many orders of magnitude smaller. Further, even if the server learns about the attack early on, there is not much that it can do about it. The only effective remedy that it has is to turn off client side deduplication for the affected files, essentially "forever."
Malicious client software A similar attack is also possible on the client side. For example, Alice can install malicious software on the machine of Bob the victim. The malicious software can use a very low-bandwidth covert channel to send to Alice the hash of interesting file, and enable Alice to get the file from the server. (In fact, in [14] it was shown how to use the deduplication service itself as a low bandwidth covert channel. The attack described here can amplify this covert channel and enable the leakage of much more data.)
As opposed to the malicious software stealing Bob's access password to the storage server, the hash-based attack works no matter how well Bob protects his credentials (e.g., even if Bob uses an external device or some TPM-based scheme to authenticate to the server). Further, the usage of a stolen password can be identified by Bob checking his account login audit files. A hash based attack cannot be easily tracked since the attacker pose as legitimate users who happen to upload the same files as Bob.
The attack can be amplified even further in the following way. The examination of Dorredorf and Pinkas [7] revealed that the client software of several file storage services, including Dropbox, stores local unencrypted manifest files, written in SQLite format. These files include an entry for each file stored by the service, which includes the hash value of the file. A malicious software can leak to Alice the hash value of this file itself. Alice can use this value to recover the manifest file, and then use the hash values stored in the manifest file to recover all files stored by Bob. The implication is that a leakage of a short hash value, which is either 20 or 32 byte long (depending on the service), leaks all of Bob's files, in a way which is essentially undetectable.
Implementations of the attack. We stress that the attacks that we describe are not just theoretical. Independently of our work, the attack was very recently discovered by Wladimir van der Laan, who started an open-source project called Dropship that uses the Dropbox storage servers as a CDN. The Dropship project was withdrawn after Dropbox had asked "in a really civil way" that its creator take down the source code, since they "felt that it is a violation of the TOS (Terms of Service)" [1, 19] .name of the second service is withheld since the relevant company has not yet been notified.). Another recent and independent implementation of the attack on Dropbox was described by Mulazzani et al. [17] .
Effect on open APIs for remote storage Given the attacks above it is clear that using only a small hash as a proxy for a large file is a security vulnerability. This issue must be addressed before creating open APIs for remotestorage that support client-side deduplication. We thus view a solution to this problem as an enabler for the creation of advanced open storage APIs.
Proofs of Ownership (PoWs)
To solve the problem of using a small hash value as a proxy for the entire file, we want to design a solution where a client proves to the server that it indeed has the file. We call a proof mechanism that prevents such leakage amplification a proof of ownership (PoW). We note that this is somewhat similar to proofs of retrievability (PORs) [15, 18] and proofs of data possession (PDPs) [3] with a role reversal (the client is the prover rather than the server). However, this role reversal is significant, and in particular the advanced POR and PDP protocols in the literature are inapplicable in our setting, see more discussion in Section 1.3.
We next discuss some important requirements that constrain our solutions:
Public hash function. To support cross-user deduplication, all clients must use the same procedure for identifying duplicate files. Hence this procedure must be public, which means that a determined attacker can learn it.
Bandwidth constraints. The protocol run between the server and client must be bandwidth efficient. Specifically, it must consume a lot less bandwidth than the size of the file (otherwise the client could just upload the file itself).
Server constraints. The server typically has to handle a huge number of files. (For example, Mozy reports storing more than 25 Petabytes of data.) The files themselves are stored on a secondary storage with a large access time, and the server can store only a small amount of data per file in fast storage (such as RAM). Moreover, the server cannot afford to retrieve the file or parts of it from secondary storage upon every upload request. The solution must therefore allow the server to store only an extremely short information per file, that will enable it to check claims from clients that they have that file.
Client constraints. The client should be able to efficiently prove to the server that it knows the file in question. This could be hard, e.g., if the file is very large and does not fit in local memory. We therefore seek a solution where the client can compute the proof by making a single pass over the file (and using a reasonable amount of memory).
On the other hand, during the computation of the proof there should be no very-short state from which the proof can be computed. Otherwise the very-short state itself can serve as a proxy for the large file, and the system will remain vulnerable to some of the atacks above.
Our security definition
For security we want to ensure that as long as the file has a lot of min-entropy (from the attacker's perspective), the attacker has only a small chance of convincing the server. We stress that in many cases, an attacker may have some partial information about the file, e.g., it may know the format of the file, its language, or the contents of large portions in the file. Hence we require security even when the entropy of file (from the attacker's perspective) is much smaller than the file length, as long as there are still a lot of uncertainty left in the file.
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Defining what it means for the file to have a lot of minentropy from the attacker's perspective turns out to be somewhat subtle. The formal definition roughly follows the CDN /malicious-software attack scenarios. Specifically, we consider an attacker that does not know all of the file, but has accomplices who have the file. The accomplices can interact with the storage server, and can help the attacker in arbitrary ways, subject to only two constraints. One constraint is that the total number of bits that the accomplices send to the attacker is much smaller than the initial min-entropy of the file (hence the file still has a lot of min-entropy even after all that communication). The other constraint is that the accomplices can only help the attacker during an offline phase before the proof protocol begins, since otherwise the attacker could just relay messages back and forth between the server and an accomplice who has the file. (The no-man-in-the-middle restriction seems justified in many of the attack scenarios.) This formulation can be viewed as an instance of the "bounded retrieval model" [6, 9] .
Our Solutions
In this work we consider a few different formal formulations of the intuitive requirement above and associated protocols that realize them. The first solution is the most stringent in terms of security, but lacks in efficiency (mainly of computation time and memory requirements). The next solutions two solutions each improve on these aspects at the cost of relaxations on the security guarantees.
A general solution Our most stringent security requirement says that as long as the min-entropy in the original file minus the number of bits sent to the adversary by the accomplices is more than the security parameter, the adversary should not be able to convince the server that it has the file (except with insignificant probability). This notion can be achieved by adopting the Merkle-tree-based proof-ofretrievability protocol. Namely, we first encode the file using an erasure code, such that it is possible to recover the whole file from any (say) 90% of the encoded bits. We then build a Merkle tree over the encoded file, and have the server ask for a super-logarithmic number of leaves, chosen at random.
From the properties of the erasure code, if the adversary is missing any of the file then there are at least 10% of the leaves that it does not know. Moreover, if the file has high min-entropy from the adversary's perspective then it cannot even guess the value of these 10% leaves with any noticeable chance for success. Hence, it will be caught with overwhelming probability.
3 This solution is described in Section 3.
A more efficient solution using universal hashing The above solution is not as efficient for the client as we would like. First, computing the erasure code requires random access to bits of the file, hence for large files that do not fit in RAM it entails too many disk accesses. Also, the server must ask for a number of leaves which is super-logarithmic in the security parameter, which means that the communication complexity of the proof protocol is ω(k log k log n) for an n-leaf tree and security parameter k. We therefore seek more efficient protocols, even at the price of settling for a somewhat weaker form of security. Specifically, we relax our security requirement by having an upper-threshold T such that if the attacker gets T bits from its accomplices then it is allowed to convince the prover (even if T is much smaller than the entropy of the file). This allows us to have a mechanism in which the client only needs O(T ) bits of internal memory in order to process the file, even if the file itself is much larger, and the communication in the protocol depends (polylogarithmically) on T and not on the size of the file. In realistic scenarios, we may get adequate security by setting T to be a rather large value (but not huge), e.g., 64 MByte. With this relaxation, a good solution would be to use universal hashing to hash the potentially large file into a reduction buffer of size at most 64MByte, and then implement the Merkle-tree protocol on the hashed values. This solution is described in Section 4.
A streaming scheme and implementation The more efficient solution can be implemented with reasonable memory, but universal hashing with such large output size is very expensive to compute. We, thus, optimize for a more practical solution for which we can still offer meaningful security analysis, albeit under some restrictions. We may argue that in realistic settings the input distribution (from the attacker's perspective) is not arbitrary, but rather is taken from a specific class of distributions. Specifically, these distributions capture cases in which there are parts of the file that the attacker may know and other parts that are essentially random. We formulate this condition (which is a generalization of "block-fixing" distributions), and describe a protocol that can be proved secure for this class of input distributions. Roughly speaking, for these common input distributions we can replace the universal hashing with a procedure that generates a good erasure code over the reduction buffer.
We stress that it is impossible to verify experimentally the assumption about the input distribution, since it is an assumption about the view of an attacker. Still it seems a reasonable assumption to make in many settings (e.g., even files in a known format contain some file specific information that is essentially random, see examples in Section 2.2.1). We also stress that we do not know of any efficiently computable input distributions under which there is an attack on our streaming scheme. It is interesting to either prove that no such distributions exist (maybe in the random-oracle model) or to exhibit one.
We implemented this streaming scheme and measured its expected effect on performance of the system (see details of the implementation and test results in Section 5.3). For large files (over 2GByte) the overhead of our protocol above reading the file and computing its SHA256, is less than 50%, and this figure drops as the file grows. The overhead for smaller files is larger, yet it is still very beneficially to run the protocol when considering the saved data transfer times. When considering an average 5Mbps network, the protocol takes no more than 4% of the time it would have taken to transfer the file via the network (and less than 1% for large files). Even with a fast 100Mbps network, client-side deduplication with our protocol beats sending the entire file to the server already for files as small as 125KByte.
Related Work
As we mentioned above, proofs-of-ownership are closely related to proofs of retrievability (POR) [15, 18, 20] and proofs of data possession (PDP) [3] . The two main differences are that (a) proofs of retrievability/data-possession often use a pre-processing step that cannot be used in proofs of ownership, and (b) our security notion is weaker than that of proofs of retrievability. We now elaborate:
No pre-processing step. In PORs/PDPs the input file is pre-processed by the client by embedding some secrets in it, which makes it possible for the server to later prove that it has the file by replying to the client queries with answers that are consistent with these secrets. In our setting, a new client comes with the only original file itself, we cannot embed secrets in it for the purpose of proofs. This rules out solutions based on MACs or signatures, for example the schemes from [3, 15, 18, 4] .
Weaker security guarantee. Our definition is not in the style of proofs-of-knowledge [11] , in that we do not require extractions. Instead, we assume that the file is chosen from a distribution and talk about the success probability of the attacker given that distribution. In this sense, our definition is somewhat reminiscent of the Storage-enforcing Commitment of Golle et al. [12] . It is obvious that our security notion is implied by the stronger extraction property. It is also not hard to show an example of a protocol which is secure according to our notion but does not have an efficient extractor. 4 Another well studied, related problem is that of verifying the integrity of memory contents in computing platforms and ensuring that no memory corruption affects the performed computations [10] . Many of these schemes utilize Merkle trees [16] for memory and data authentication.
PRELIMINARIES
We briefly survey the tools that we use and state our security definition. Denote by [n] the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Error correction codes
n , that has the property that for any two different values x, y ∈ {0, 1} k , the Hamming distance between E(x) and E(y) is at least d. The smallest distance between any two codewords is called the minimumdistance of the code. A code with minimum-distance d can recover from any d − 1 erasures.
Pairwise independent hashing A family H of functions from {0, 1}
k to {0, 1} n is pairwise independent (aka 2-universal) if for every two different values x, y ∈ {0, 1} k and every two strings a, b ∈ {0, 1} n , when choosing at random h ∈R H the probability that h maps x to a and y to b is exactly 2 −2n .
Collision resistant hashing A collision-resistant hash function has shorter output than input, and yet it is hard to find efficiently two inputs that maps to the same output. Formally, a family of functions H is collision resistant if no efficient algorithm can find, on input a random h ∈ H, two different inputs x ̸ = y such that h(x) = h(y) (except with insignificant probability). In practice we use a single function that accepts arbitrary-size input and has a fixed-size output (e.g., SHA256 with 256 bits of output).
Merkle Trees
A Merkle tree provides a succinct "commitment" to a large buffer, such that it is later possible to "open" and verify individual blocks of the buffer without giving the entire buffer. To construct a Merkle tree we split the input buffer into blocks, then group the blocks in pairs and use a collisionresistant hash function to hash each pair. The hash values are then again grouped in pairs and each pair is further hashed, and this process is repeated until only a single hash value remains. This results in a binary tree with the leaves corresponding to the blocks of the input buffer and the root corresponding to the last remaining hash value. In order to commit to a buffer, one sends the root of the Merkle tree on this buffer. In order to "open" a commitment to a specific block, the committer sends the hash value of this block, and all of the hashes needed to construct the path between the leaf and root of the merkle tree. Basically this consists of all of the hash values of "siblings" along the path from leaf to root (a total of h hash values on a 2 h sized buffer). The collision-resistance of the hash ensures that an efficient committer can only open to the original value.
All our solutions use the following basic proof protocol, between a verifier that has the root value of a Merkle tree on a buffer (and the number of leaves in the tree), and a prover who claims to know the underlying buffer. The verifier simply chooses u random choices of leaf indexes (u depends on the security parameter) and ask the prover for the value of the corresponding leaves. The prover replies with these leaves and with a sibling path for each one of them, and the verifier accepts if all these sibling paths are valid.
Our security proofs rely on a well-known Merkle-tree lemma, which says that every prover that passes the Merkle-tree protocol with high enough probability can be converted into an extractor that extracts most of the leaves of the tree. Details appear in the full version of this paper [13] .
Proofs of Ownership
Proof-of-ownership is a protocol in two parts between two players on a joint input F (which is the input file). First the verifier summarizes to itself the input file F and generates a (shorter) verification information v. Later, the prover and verifier engage in an interactive protocol in which the prover has F and the verifier only has v, at the end of which the verifier either accepts or rejects. Hence a proof-of-ownership is specified by a summary function S(·) (which could be randomized and takes the input file F and a security parameter), and an interactive two-party protocol Π(P ↔ V ).
Validity. The scheme P = (S, Π) is valid if (a) S and Π are efficient, and (b) for every input file F ∈ {0, 1} n and every value of the security parameter n, it holds that Π(P (F, 1 n ) ↔ V (S(F, 1 n ))) ⇒ accept with all but a negligible probability (in n).
Efficiency.
The main efficiency parameters of a proofof-ownership are (a) the size of the summary information v = S(F, 1 n ), (b) the communication complexity of the protocol Π, and (c) the computation complexity of computing the function S and of the two parties in Π (all with respect to the file size |F | and the security parameter n). We seek solutions where the dependence on the security parameter is linear, the computation complexity of S and P is linear in |F | and the rest is at most (poly) logarithmic in |F |.
Another efficiency parameter that can be important is the space complexity of S, P when viewed as one-pass algorithms that access the input file in a streaming fashion. (This is significant since for large files we would like to read them sequentially from disk only once, and we do not have enough memory to store them all.)
Security of Proofs-of-Ownership
Our goal is to ensure that the file does not have a "small representation" that when leaked to an attacker allows the attacker to obtain the file from the server. Ideally, we would like the smallest representation of the file to be as long as the amount of entropy in the file itself. There are three regimes of parameters to keep in mind here:
Low-entropy files. These could be either small files, or large files that are mostly known. For example, consider two MS-Word documents describing two employees in a company. These files may be very large but differ on very few fields. Hence from the point of view of employee A, the file of employee B has very small entropy.
Medium-entropy files. These are files that have quite a lot of uncertainty, but still much less than their actual size. For example, consider an attacker that has a new movie with an invisible digital watermarking, and wants to get the nonwatermarked movie from the storage server. Here the movie itself could be many megabytes long, and the only thing that the attacker does not know is the exact embedding of the watermarks which could be just a few kilobytes.
High-entropy files. These are large files that are mostly unknown to the attacker. For example, one can think of attackers that try to use the storage server as a contentdistribution network (CDN): One client uploads the file to a server and sends a second client just a short message that allows the second client to get the file from the server.
To capture security our attack scenario postulates an arbitrary distribution D from which the input file F is chosen. The file is then given to the storage server who runs the summary function to get v = S(F ). Next there is a "learning phase" in which the adversary can set-up client accomplices and have them receive the file F and run the proof protocol with the server. The accomplices can interact freely with the adversary during the same "learning phase."
Then the game moves to a "proof phase", in which the adversary engages in the proof protocol with the server but cannot interact with the accomplices.
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Our first (and strongest) security definition (addressed in Section 3) roughly says that as long as the min-entropy in the original distribution is sufficiently larger than the number of bits sent to the adversary by the accomplices, the adversary should not be able to convince the server that it has the file.
Definition 1. Fix parameters s ∈ N, ε ∈ [0, 1]. A scheme P = (S, Π) is a strong proof of ownership with slackness s and soundness error ε if for any t ∈ N and any input distribution D with t bits of min entropy, and any adversary as above that receives less than t − s bits from the accomplices during the game, the adversary has probability of convincing the storage server that it has the file that is at most negligible in s more than ε.
Our second definition (addressed in Section 4) relaxes the restriction that the proof fails unless the accomplices send all the entropy of the file to the adversary. Instead, we have a leakage threshold T (set by the designers of the system) such that we allow the attacker to convince the server if it receives T or more bits from the accomplices, regardless of the entropy of the original file. This does not effect much the low-or medium-entropy cases, but it weakens the defense in the high-entropy case. For example, if we set the threshold at 64Mbyte then the server can still be used as a CDN, except that the "short" message that clients must send to each other in order to use it will be 64Mbyte long. 
, if for any t ∈ N, any input distribution D with t bits of min entropy, and any adversary as above that receives less than min(T, t − s) bits from the accomplices during the game, the verifier rejects the proof with all but negligibly more than ε probability.
Our last definition (addressed in Section 5) further relaxes the security requirement, in that we do not insist on protecting every input distribution, but just distributions taken from some class (which we believe captures all the "input distributions that appear in practice").
Definition 3. Fix parameters s, T ∈ N, ε ∈ [0, 1] and a class CD of distributions. A scheme P = (S, Π) is a proof of ownership with respect to CD with leakage threshold T , slackness s, and soundness error ε, if for any t ∈ N, any input distribution D ∈ CD with t bits of min entropy, and any adversary as above that receives less than min(T, t − s) bits from the accomplices, the adversary has at most negligibly more than ε probability of convincing the storage server that it has the file.
Note that our definitions and solutions also generalize to a computational analog of entropy, i.e. the distribution is computationally indistinguishable from one with the relevant entropy. 
A MERKLE-TREE-BASED SOLUTION
Our first solution is also a proof of retrievability protocol: in a nutshell it works by encoding the file using an erasure code, and then building a Merkle-tree over the encoded file. Specifically, let E : {0,
be an erasure code, resilient to erasure of upto α fraction of the bits (for some 6 See Section 6 for a way to add protection against CDN attacks also to our more efficient protocols from Sections 4 and 5. 7 The reason is that since the verifier in a proof-of-ownership can be efficiently simulated, then an efficient strategy that fools the proof on a pseudo-entropy distribution, can be used to distinguish between the pseudo-entropy and real entropy distributions.
constant α > 0). Namely, from any (1 − α)M ′ bits of E(F ) it is possible in principle to completely recover the original F ∈ {0, 1} n . For this application it is not important that the recovery procedure be efficient, in fact any code E(·) with minimum distance greater than αM ′ will do. In addition, let H be a collision resistant hash function with output length of n bits (e.g., SHA256 with n = 256), and we denote by M T H,b (X) the binary Merkle tree over buffer X using b-bit leaves and the hash function H. The Basic Construction 8 We use parameters b = 256 (the Merkle-tree leaf size), ε (the desired soundness bound), and α (the erasure recovery capability of the code). We use the collision-resistant hash function H(·) and the α-erasure-code E(·). On M -bit input file F ∈ {0, 1} M , the verifier computes the encoding X = E(F ) and then the Merkle tree M T H,b (X) and keeps only the root of the tree (and the number of leaves) as verification information. During the proof protocol, the verified chooses at random u leaf indexes, ℓ1, . . . , ℓu, where u is the smallest integer such that (1 − α) u < ε. The verifier asks the prover for the sibling-paths of all the leaves, and accepts if all are valid with respect to M T H,b (X).
Theorem 1. The basic construction is a proof-of-ownership protocol as per Definition 1 with soundness (1 − α)
u .
PROTOCOLS WITH SMALL SPACE
The problem with using the generic solution from the previous section is that good erasure codes for very large files are expensive to compute. In particular, it seems that computing a good erasure code require random access to the file, which means that for files larger than the available memory this computation entails many accesses to the disk.
We get around this problem by introducing a security/space tradeoff: Namely we allow the designer of the system to specify a memory-bound L such that (a) the client only needs roughly L bits of memory during the computation even for a very large files, but (b) leaking more than O(L) bits may allow the adversary to cheat in the proof (even if the file has much higher entropy).
The idea is that instead of encoding the file with an erasure code, we hash it down to L bits using a hash function with public randomness, and then do the Merkle tree protocol over the hashed value. What makes this solution nontrivial is the fact that the adversary can choose the leakage functions depending on the public randomness, for example the adversary can ask to see L/2 bits of the hash value. Using Pairwise Independent Hashing One solution that works is to use an arbitrary pairwise-universal hash family H that maps M bit files to (say) L bits. In is instructive to think of the setting M ≫ L ≫ s, and about input distribution D with k = L + 2s bits of min-entropy. Note that with high probability over choice of h ∈ H it is likely that h(F ) has high min-entropy, but this is not enough for us. For example, an adversary can try to find a large set of blocks in the buffer h(F ) such that the projection of h(F ) onto these blocks has small min entropy. Then the adversary can ask for leakage only on these blocks, and hope that all the queries during the Merkle-tree hash will fall in this large set of blocks.
To show that this line of attack does not work we need to prove that when h is chosen at random from a pairwise independent family, then with high probability every large subset of the blocks of h(F ) has high min-entropy. See full version [13] for details. Using this property we show that the "small-space" protocol based on universal hashing meets our intermediate security notion of Definition 2. ).
A STREAMING PROTOCOL
Although it is possible in principle to implement pairwiseindependent hashing of M bits into an L-bit buffer in a one-pass fashion using only roughly L bits of memory (e.g., if we use linear hashing), such implementation would be prohibitively expensive for large M, L. In this section we present a variant of the space-efficient protocol that can be implemented much more efficiently, and for which we can still argue security in realistic settings. We "pay" for the efficiency by only being able to prove security for a more restrictive set of input distributions, and only under a (reasonable) assumption about the linear code that we obtain.
We present our scheme as a series of modifications to the general universal hashing scheme using linear hashing. In the basic universal hashing scheme the file is viewed as a bit vector and multiplied by a random Boolean matrix. Namely, each bit in the file is XORed to a random subset of locations in the buffer (approximately to half of the locations). The main modifications that we make are as follows:
Blocks vs. bits: Viewing the file as a bit vector is very taxing performance wise, as we need to process the bits individually. Instead we operate on blocks of B bits at a time (for example, B = 512 bits to match the block size of SHA256). For a file of M bits we denote the number of blocks by m = ⌈M/B⌉, and the L-bit buffer holds ℓ = ⌈L/B⌉ blocks. All operations in the final solutions will be XOR operations on blocks of bits, allowing for high performance.
Theoretically, this choice could severely hurt the properties of our encoding (since now the first bits of the blocks never interact with the second bits of the blocks, etc.) But practically we can justify this choice under the assumption that real life uncertainty about file contents comes at the granularity of blocks, rather than uncertainty of single bits. Roughly, the attacker may have some parts of the file that it knows and others that it does not, and these parts are not individual bits but rather they are larger blocks. We thus prove the security of our scheme with respect to a input distributions that come in blocks, and argue that this should still provide adequate security in practical settings. See Section 5.1 for a precise description of the input distributions that we consider.
Sparse reduction and mixing phases:
Even when working with full blocks, adding every input block to a large number of random locations requires an order of mℓ operations, which is still too expensive. (Even for not-so-long files of size ≈ ℓ blocks requires work that is quadratic in the buffer length, O(ℓ 2 ).) Instead we aim for a solution that takes as close to m + ℓ operations as we can get. Our encoding solution consists of two phases:
First we have a reduction phase in which the m-blocks file's content is reduced into the reduction buffer of ℓ blocks.
In this stage each block from the file is XORed to a constant number of random locations in the buffer (where the constant is as small as 4 in our implementation). The small constant is significant for performance, but it means that we have poor diffusion. For example starting from a file with only a single unknown block we end up with a buffer with only four unknown blocks.
To overcome this, we run a mixing phase on the buffer (this stage works on the buffer alone, not the original file). In this phase, we make several passes over the buffer, each time XORing every block into four other random locations in the buffer. This phase resembles the reduction phase but takes as input current blocks from the buffer rather than input blocks from the original file. Intuitively, this "unbalanced Feistel" structure should give us good diffusion if we run enough passes, since each unknown block will eventually "contaminate" all the blocks in the buffer. (We evaluated the required number of passes experimentally, and observed that 4-5 passes are enough to get very good diffusion.)
Cyclic shifts on blocks: Simply XORing full blocks onto the buffer causes an unknown block to cancel itself if it is XORed an even number of times. Hence in general we expect each unknown block to influence only 50% of the blocks in the buffer, even after many passes. To get better diffusion (without paying in performance) we apply a very simple cyclic shift to the block before XORing it. Specifically, with B = 512-bit blocks, we XOR each block into four location, with shifts of 0,128,256 and 384 positions, respectively. (These shift values were chosen to give good performance on machines with word-size up to 128 bits.) With this twist each unknown block will influence roughly 15/16 of the blocks in the output buffer as opposed to only 1/2. Using self contained pseudorandomness: As described so far, the transformation can be viewed as a fixed linear mapping from an m-block file to an ℓ-block buffer. However, the description of this mapping is quite large: for each block position in the file/buffer we need to specify four indexes in the buffer where this block should be XORed. Note that the server and all clients have to agree on this mapping, so we cannot just let each of them choose it at random as they go along. Possible relief can be obtained by choosing this randomness "once and for all" and hard-wiring it in the code or to generate it pseudo-randomly from a short seed.
In our implementation we use a speedup that allows us to get the mapping "for free": Observe that the client must anyway hash the input file, so that the server could compare the hash value and decide if that file already exists in the database. Hashing the file (say with SHA256) require applying the underlying SHA256 compression function to each block of the input file, thus computing a 256-bit chaining value that is used when hashing the next block. In our implementation these intermediate IV values double also as the specification of our mapping. Namely, we derive from each intermediate chaining value the four indexes that tell us where in the output buffer to XOR the current block. Under the random oracle model (where SHA256 is assumed to approximate a random function), this gives us the random mapping that we need (and we store these indexes and use them again during the mixing phase). This trick greatly improves performance, since the mapping can now be computed from the file using quantities that we have anyway.
Note that we are using a different set of pseudorandom choices for different files, which heuristically could help security, but we are using it here as a performance optimization trick rather than a security enhancement mechanism.
Security of the Streaming Scheme
As we said above, for this implementation we can only prove security for a restrictive class of input distributions. This class is a (slight generalization of) block-fixing distribution: Essentially, from the attacker's perspective there are blocks in the input file that are completely random, and others that are fully known. We generalize block-fixing distributions somewhat by allowing the random blocks to be chosen from a low-rank linear space, this captures for example the case where the same random block appears in the file several times. We argue that these generalized blockfixing distributions are a reasonably good approximation to input distributions that can be found in practice, in that a real-world attacker may know some parts of a file (e.g., fixed formatting), and may even know that some unknown parts must be equal to each other (e.g., the same information appears multiple times), but typically cannot know much more complicated information about the file.
A good way of thinking about this generalized bit-fixing sources is that a length-M input file with k-bits of (min)-entropy is obtained by choosing a k-bit random vector ⃗ w ∈ {0, 1} k and computing the file itself as
k×M and ⃗ b ∈ {0, 1} M are chosen by the adversary (and A has full rank). This is generalized to B-bit blocks if each bit in w is replaced by a random B bit block but the operation of A remains the same (except applied to full blocks rather than bits).
Our hashing function can therefore be thought of as taking the "adversarially encoded"
M ×L ), then we can view the hashed image as a (coset of a) linear code, E( ⃗ w) = ⃗ w · AC + ( ⃗ bC). We show below that the resulting scheme will be secure as long as the linear code generated by the matrix AC has large minimum distance. The proof of Theorem 3 is given in the full version [13] . For the security of our protocol we argue that when choosing a matrix C as a product of a random sparse reduction matrix R and many Feistel mixing steps Mi, we get a good code with high probability (for every full rank A). For example, if the code has minimum distance ≥ ℓ/3 then we get soundness of (2/3) t . Unfortunately, it seems very hard to analyze the error-correction properties of such a construction, so we can only argue security under the unproven assumption that we get a good code. (In fact we can get by with a slightly weaker condition: Instead of requiring that the code AC does not have low-weight words, it is enough to assume that an efficient adversary cannot find a low-weight word in this code.)
Implementation
Below we describe the actual implementation and parameters of our scheme. 
3.
If Block size: We use 512-bit blocks, which is also the block size of SHA256.
Buffer size: For smaller files uses a buffer roughly the size of the file. 9 For large files we limit the buffer to size 64MByte. This seems sufficient for most applications (leaking 64MByte is quite a bit), and at the same time fits comfortably in main memory of contemporary machines.
Usage of Hash IVs:
Hash IV s are computed in the reduction phase and then the same IVs are used again in the mixing phase. Each IV contains 256 bits and we typically use 80 (or less) of these bits as indexes for 4 locations in the buffer (there are at most 2 20 blocks in the reduction buffer). If the buffer is longer than the input file then we use more bits from the IVs as indexes.
Number of iterations:
The number of required iterations was tested empirically and shown in Figure 2 . We see a convergence to affecting 15/16 of the blocks within 4 − 5 iterations. For the smaller buffer sizes, the mixing is slightly faster, and if a larger number of blocks is initially unknown, then the mixing may be as fast as 3 iterations. We set the number of iterations to 5 to accommodate for the largest buffer size (64MByte) and as low as one unknown block.
Number of challenge leaves:
We set the number of challenge leaves in the Merkle tree to 20. Under the assumption that the code gives distance of 0.1L this will translate to a soundness error on the order of 2 −66 if no leakage from accomplices is allowed, and to an error on the order of 2 −20 if leakage of up to 0.4L is allowed. Note that the error does not have to be negligibly small, since the service can block de-duplication attempts for a file once it has failed a PoW more than, say, 3 times.
Performance Evaluation
We implemented the PoW protocol 10 and below we evaluate its performance considering the following aspects:
Client time (Ctime). This includes the time for reading the file from disk, computing its SHA256, performing the reduction and mixing phases, and computing the Merkle-tree over the resulting buffer. Our measurements show that the reduction phase adds less than 28% time over the insecure solution of just computing the SHA256 value of the file. The mixing and Merkle-tree times are relatively significant for small files (about 3 fold slowdown compared to the SHA256 computation), but once the file grows beyond 64MByte these times remain constant (844 and 1158ms respectively) since they are only applied to the 64MByte buffer.
11
For files larger than 2GByte the overhead of our scheme (vs. only computing SHA256) is less than 50%. When further increasing the file size this overhead continues to decrease and the time to compute SHA256 becomes more dominant. These results are depicted in Figure 3 .
Server time (Stime)
. This is the time spent by the server checking the Merkle tree authentication signatures. We observed that the overhead of these tests is very low, validating 20 sibling paths takes approximately 0.6 ms.
Network time (Ntime)
. This is the estimated time required to transfer the protocol data. The overall size of the message transmitted by the protocol for 20 challenges is less than 20K. Thus, the network transmission time for a 5Mbps network is less than 0.1ms and is negligible.
Time savings by using deduplication. Figures 4 and  5 show the time-saving for the client by using deduplication (including the PoW overhead) compared to a policy 10 The measurements are done on random files in range 16KByte -16GByte, Intel Xeon X5570 CPU, 2.93GHz. The protocol is implemented in C++ and uses SHA256 function of the Crypto++ [5] . 11 Note that the mixing and Merkle-tree computations can be performed after the client has sent the SHA256 value to the server and is waiting for the server to check if the file is already in the database and can be de-duplicated. Hence, in practice this time may be swallowed by the network latency. of always sending the entire file to the server. We considered two network settings, one with an average speed for a fast network (5Mbps) [2] and the other being an extremely fast network (100Mbps). We observed that for the 5Mbps network, the PoW scheme always consumes less time than transmitting the file over the network (even for files of about 15KBytes). For the 100Mbps network deduplication (including the PoW) is faster than transmitting the file for sizes larger than 64KBytes. Furthermore, the benefit from using the PoW increases with the file size, e.g., for files larger than 1GByte the time consumed by PoW comprises of less than 1% and 20% of the upload time (for 5Mbps and 100Mbps respectively). Overall, by using PoWs one can get the benefits of clientside deduplication without sacrificing security. The benefits become higher as files grow and for better deduplication ratio, as well as for slower networks.
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this work we put forward the notion of proof-of-ownership, by which a client can prove to a server that it has a copy of a file without actually sending it. This allows to counter attacks on file-deduplication systems where the attacker obtains a "short summary" of the file and uses it to fool the server into thinking that the attacker owns the entire file. We gave three definitions for security in this setting and three matching protocols, the last of which is very practical. Our streaming protocol allows the designer of the scheme to set a threshold for how "short" a summary can a file have (e.g., 64MBytes in our implementation). This seem suitable for the attack scenarios of common hash functions, malicious software, or accidental leakage.
For CDN attacks the protection of our protocol is not as strong as one could hope for, but a very simple fix can augment this streaming system also against CDN-type attacks: simply use two Merkle trees, one over the file itself and the other over the encoded buffer (and the server can keep only the hash of the two roots). Roughly speaking, the bufferMerkle-tree addresses the low-entropy and medium-entropy cases while the file-Merkle-tree addresses the high-entropy case. This composed solution can run using small space with running time about twice higher that in Section 5.3. Note that this solution does not cover all ranges of the parameters. E.g., for a 16GByte file with 128MByte of entropy, an attacker can use only 64MByte of leakage and has a chance to convince the server. However, this parameter setting does not seem to appear much in typical applications.
We remark that the new attacks that we consider and our solutions to them are more relevant for file-level deduplication than for block-level deduplication. (Indeed, if an attacker can learn a hash value for each 8KByte block of the file, then it can probably learn also the blocks themselves and does not need to fool the storage server.) Note, however, that the attack remains relevant (and our solution useful) when a service uses both file-and block-level deduplication, as is likely to be the case in practical systems.
